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Abstract
The value of an asset is generally not known ap r i o r i , and it requires costly investments
t ob ed i s c o v e r e d . I ns u c hc o n t e x t sw i t he n d o g e n o us information acquisition, which selling
procedure generates more revenues? We show that dynamic formats such as ascending
price or multi-stage auctions perform better than their static counterpart. This is because
dynamic formats allow bidders to observe the number of competitors left throughout the
selling procedure. Thus, even if competition appears strong ex ante, it may turn out to
be weak along the dynamic format, thereby making the option to acquire information
valuable. This very possibility also induces the bidders to stay longer in the auction, just
to learn about the state of competition. Both eﬀects boost revenues, and our analysis
provides a rationale for using dynamic formats rather than sealed-bid ones.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Assessing the value of an asset for sale is a costly activity. When a ﬁrm is being sold, each
individual buyer has to ﬁgure out the best use of the assets, which business unit to keep or
resell, which site or production line to close. The resources spent can be very large when there
is no obvious way for the buyer to combine the asset for sale with the assets that he already
owns. Similarly, when acquiring a license for digital television, entrants have to ﬁgure out
the type of program they will have a comparative advantage on, as well as the advertisement
revenues they can expect from the type of program they wish to broadcast. Incumbents may
also want to assess the economies of scale that can be derived from the new acquisition. All
such activities are aimed at reﬁning the assessment of the valuation of the license, and they
are costly.
From the seller’s perspective, if the assets are auctioned to a set of potential buyers,
the better informed the bidders are the higher the revenues, at least when the number of
c o m p e t i t o r si sn o tt o os m a l l . 1 However, when information is costly to acquire, a potential
buyer may worry about the possibility that he spends many resources, and yet ends up not
winning the asset. Providing the bidders with incentives to acquire information is thus key
for the seller.
One commonly used format for selling assets is the sealed-bid auction, in which the
winner is selected in a single round. Other formats (which are frequently used when the asset
is complex) are multi-stage auctions and ascending price auctions, in which the number of
potential buyers is gradually reduced.2 In the sealed-bid format, information acquisition may
only take place prior to the auction. In dynamic formats, information acquisition may take
place not only prior to the auction, but also in the course of the auction.
Our objective is to compare dynamic and static auction formats in settings in which
some bidders initially know their valuations while others have the option to acquire further
information on their valuation at some cost.3
1The reason is that a bidder with a (mediocre) expected valuation may realize, once informed, that his
valuation is quite high, hence the increase in revenue. Of course, he may also realize that his valuation is quite
low, but if competition is strong, this eﬀect on revenues is small.
2See Ye (2000) for an account of how widespread the practice of multi-stage auctions are.
3An alternative interpretation is that agents have heterogeneous information acquisition costs.
2The main insight of this paper is that dynamic auction procedures are likely to generate
more information acquisition and higher revenues than their static counterparts.4 More
precisely, we highlight a signiﬁcant beneﬁt induced by formats in which bidders gradually get
to know the number of (serious) competitors they are facing, which in turn allow them to
better adjust their information acquisition strategy.
To get some intuition for our insight, observe that in the sealed-bid static format, bidders
do not acquire information on their valuations whenever there are suﬃciently many competi-
tors. The point is that the risk of ending up not buying the good (because it turns out that
someone else has a higher value) is then so large that bidders prefer not to waste their money
(or time) on getting such precise information. In contrast, in the ascending price auction
format, bidders get to obtain a better estimate of their chance of winning just by observing
the number of bidders left. In particular, even if competition appears strong ex ante, it may
turn out to be weak (if many bidders drop out), and information acquisition may then be-
come a valuable option. This has two eﬀects: ﬁrst, it generates more information acquisition
(hence more revenues - at least when the number of bidders is not too small). Second, it
may induce bidders to wait and remain active in the auction, just to learn more about the
state of competition. The latter eﬀect also raises the price paid by winners, hence revenues,
as compared with the price paid in the sealed-bid format.
It should be emphasized that the reason why dynamic formats generate more revenues
here is completely diﬀerent from the classic reason of aﬃliated values (Milgrom-Weber 1982)
in which ascending formats allow the bidders to learn about the information held by others.
Here, the valuations of bidders are not inﬂuenced by other bidders’ information (we con-
sider a private-value setting), and yet dynamic auction formats generate higher revenues (by
modifying bidders’ information acquisition strategy on their own valuations).
Our paper can thus be viewed as providing a (new) rationale for using dynamic auction
formats. But, note that our discussion has highlighted the role of providing bidders with
some estimate of the level of competition (through the number of competitors left), and not
all dynamic formats have the property of conveying such an estimate. Dynamic formats
that do not have this property are less desirable from the perspective of this paper. For
4Though we focus here on revenues, eﬃciency may also be higher in the ascending format (see Compte-
Jehiel 2000).
3the sake of illustration, consider the one-object ascending price auction with secret drop-out
in which bidders observe the current level of price, but not how many competitors are left.
This is the auction format studied in an independent work by Rezende (2005). As it turns
out (see Section 5), in our model in which the information acquisition cost is assumed to be
bounded away from 0, bidders do not to acquire information on their valuations when there
are suﬃciently many competitors. So the ascending price auction with secret drop-out is
equivalent to the sealed-bid auction, and it is dominated by the ascending price auction (in
which bidders observe the number of bidders left) when there are suﬃciently many bidders
(see Section for further discussion on Rezende’s paper).
Related literature:
Our paper is related to various strands of literature in auction theory: the comparison of
auction formats (and more precisely here the comparison of the second price and ascending
price auction formats), the analysis of information acquisition in auctions and the literature
on entry in auctions.
Concerning the comparison between auction formats, we mentioned earlier the work by
Milgrom-Weber (1982), who showed that, in aﬃliated value settings, the ascending and
sealed-bid formats diﬀer because the information on others’ signals conveyed in equilibrium
diﬀer, hence the bidders’ assessment of their valuation diﬀer too. In the context of auctions
with negative externalities (see Jehiel-Moldovanu 1996), Das Varma (1999) has shown that
the ascending format could (under some conditions) generate higher revenues than the sealed-
bid (second-price) auction format (in the ascending format a bidder may be willing to stay
longer, so as to combat a harmful competitor if he happens to be the remaining bidder).5
Concerning information acquisition in auctions, the literature has (in contrast to our
work) focused on sealed-bid types of auction mechanisms, and it has essentially examined
eﬃciency issues.6
5In a companion paper (Compte-Jehiel 2004), we also make a comparison between sealed bid and ascending
price auctions, in a setting where information acquisition is exogenous: bidders get more precise signal as time
elapses. In contrast, here, information acquisition is endogenous: bidders have to decide whether (and when)
to acquire information.
6One exception is an independent contribution by Rezende (2005), that examines the ascending price
auction with secret drop out. Building on Compte and Jehiel (2000), Rasmussen (2001) considers a two-
4In a private value model, Hausch and Li (1991) show that ﬁrst price and second price
auctions are equivalent in a symmetric setting (see also Tan 1992).7 Stegeman (1996) shows
that second price auction induces an ex ante eﬃcient information acquisition in the single
unit independent private values case (see also Bergemann and Valimaki 2000). However, in
Compte and Jehiel (2000), it is shown that the ascending price auction may induce an even
greater level of expected welfare.
Models of information acquisition in interdependent value contexts (in static mechanisms)
include Milgrom (1981) who studies second-price auctions, Matthews (1977), (1984) who
studies ﬁrst-price auctions and analyzes in a pure common value context whether the value
of the winning bid converges to the true value of the object as the number of bidders gets
large,8 Persico (1999) who compares incentives for information acquisition in the ﬁrst price
and second price auctions in the aﬃliated value setting, and Bergemann and Valimaki (2000)
who investigate, in a general interdependent value context, the impact of ex post eﬃciency
on the ex ante incentives for information acquisition.
Our paper is also related to the literature on endogenous entry in auctions, which includes
McAfee and McMillan (1987), Harstad (1990) and Levin and Smith (1994).9 In these models,
each bidder makes an entry decision prior to the auction, at a stage where bidders do not
know their valuation. The decision to enter allows the bidder to both participate to the
bidder dynamic auction with deadline (motivated by internet auctions) in which one bidder can reﬁne her
valuation at a cost. He observes that the informed bidder may wait till close to the deadline to make the
uninformed bidder believe that he can win the object without having to reﬁne her valuation.
7Engelbrecht-Wiggans (2001) also compares ﬁrst price and second price auctions, but he examines the case
where bidders acquire information on the number of competitors (rather than on their own valuation). These
two formats are then not equivalent, since knowing the number of bidders is valuable in the ﬁrst price auction
only.
8See also Hausch and Li (1993) for an analysis of information acquisition in common value settings.
9These papers analyze the eﬀect of entry fees or reserve prices on the seller’s revenue. McAfee-McMillan
(1987) show that in constrast with the case where the number of participants is given exogenously, the
optimal reserve price may be zero (this insight is related to that of Bulow-Klemperer (1996) about the positive
role of competition in symmetric setups). Levin-Smith (1994) (see also Harstad 1990) further analyze this
issue by considering (symmetric) equilibria with possibly stochastic participation. They ﬁnd that restricting
the number of participants to equate the socially optimal number of bidders eliminates the coordination
problem that would arise otherwise (if the number of bidders is larger than the socially optimal one, stochastic
participation cannot be avoided and may result in no participation).
5auction and learn her valuation. These models thus combine the idea of participation costs
and the idea of information acquisition. This should be contrasted with our model in which
there is no participation cost but only a cost to acquire information on the valuation.
Finally, our work is also related to the literature on research contests (Fullerton and
McAfee (1998), and more recently Che and Gale (2001)). The main virtue of the ascending
price auction identiﬁed in this paper is that it increases the incentives to acquire information
as, for some realizations of signals, it allows the bidders to realize that competition is less
tough than it would have seemed from an ex ante viewpoint. Likewise, Fullerton and McAfee
(1998) and Che and Gale (2001) identify conditions under which it is a good idea from an
eﬃciency viewpoint to reduce the number of contestants to just a few (in fact two) in an
attempt to increase contestants’ incentives to exert eﬀort in the contest.10
T h er e s to ft h ep a p e ri so r g a n i z e da sf o l l o w s .Section 2 describes the basic model. Section
3 develops the basic analysis that paves the way to the revenue comparison performed in
Section 4. Further discussion of our model appears in Section 5.
2 The Model
There is one object for sale, worth 0 to the seller and n potential risk-neutral buyers indexed
by i ∈ N = {1,...,n}. Each bidder i =1 ,...,n has a valuation θi for the object. The
valuations θi for the various bidders i are assumed to be drawn from independent and identical
distributions, with support on a ﬁnite number of values θk,k∈ {1,..,K},w i t h0 < θ1 < ···<
θk < ···< θK = ¯ θ.W ed e n o t eb yf(θk) the corresponding probability that the valuation is
θk.11
10There are obviously many diﬀerences between an auction setup in which the value of winning is determined
by the valuation and a contest in which the prize is common to all contestants, but the two setups share a
common feature: less ﬁerce competition increases the incentive to acquire information in our setup or to make
eﬀort in the contest application.
11The assumption that the distribution is discrete is made so as to guarantee the existence of the equilibrium.
Beyond existence issues our analysis does not rely on this assumption. We discuss in Section 5 the continuum
type case.
On the interpretative side, one economic motivation for the discreteness of the distribution is that there are
only K possible signals that a bidder may observe concerning his valuation, and each θ
k corresponds to an
expected valuation given signal k.
6In our model, there will be two types of buyers: the informed buyers,w h ok n o wt h e
realization of their own valuation; and the uninformed buyers, who may get informed about
their own valuation at some cost c. One possible interpretation is that for some bidders, in-
formation acquisition is costless, hence they become informed. We assume that each bidder’s
informational state (whether he is informed or not) is private information. We denote by n1
the number of informed bidders, and by n2 the number of uninformed buyers. We assume
that bidders’ informational states are drawn from a distribution with full support on (n1,n 2),
n1 + n2 = n.
For the sake of comparative statics on the number of bidders, we will also consider the
symmetric case where initially, each bidder i is informed with some probability q ∈ (0,1) and
uninformed with probability 1−q, and where informational states are drawn from independent
distributions.





When he acquires information, bidder i learns the realization θi. Other bidders however
do not observe that realization; they do not observe either whether information acquisition
occurred. Finally, it will be convenient to denote by θ(1), θ(2)..., θ(j) the highest valuation,
the second highest valuation, and the jth highest valuation, respectively among the (initially)
informed bidders. We deﬁne similarly θ(1)
u , θ(2)
u ..., θ(j)
u for the (initially) uninformed bidders
where θ(j)
u is obtained using the valuations these bidders would observe if they were to acquire
information.13
The information structure is assumed to be common knowledge among all bidders.
Remark: The interpretation behind the deﬁnition of v (expression (1)) is that in case
he wins, bidder i will learn the realization θi at no cost. Hence the only motive for spending
resources on acquiring information is in checking that it is worthwhile to acquire the object.
In some contexts (for example when bidders compete to acquire a ﬁrm), the resources that a
12In Compte and Jehiel (2000), we analyze the more general case in which an uninformed bidder i gets an
imperfect signal about θi prior to the auction. No new insight is gained by doing so however.
13By modeling the situation as an initial draw by nature determining the valuations of each bidder, θ
(j)
u can
be deﬁned irrespective of bidders’ information acquisition strategy.
7bidder spends on acquiring information are best thought of as an investment that will have
to be made anyway, in case that bidder wins.14 To cover such applications, one would need
to modify the expected valuation from acquiring the asset into
K X
k=1
θkf(θk) − c. (2)
Our analysis would extend in a straightforward way to this alternative formulation (by
equating v with the expression above); and our main result that the ascending format gener-
ates more revenues would even be stronger in that case. We will however stick to the previous
formulation in which v i sa ss h o w ni n( 1 ) .
Auction formats:
Throughout the analysis, we will be mostly interested in the comparison between static
and dynamic auction formats. We will compare the sealed bid second-price auction and the
ascending price auction. The key diﬀerence we will be exploiting is that in the static format,
information acquisition may only take place prior to the auction, while in the dynamic format,
it may also take place in the course of the auction when additional information is available.
The sealed bid second-price auction. Each bidder submits a bid. The object is allocated
to the bidder whose bid is highest at a price equal to the second highest bid.15 Each bidder
decides prior to the auction whether or not to acquire information.
The ascending price auction. Dates are discrete: t =0 ,1... At date t =0 , the price
starts at 0.A t a n y d a t e t ≥ 0, each bidder is given in turn the option to drop out of the
auction. The order in which bidders are given that option is drawn randomly from a uniform
distribution over ranks, and kept secret. As soon as a bidder drops out, the process stops,
the auction resumes at date t+1, and the current price is unchanged. When no bidder drops
out, the auction resumes at date t +1 , and the current price increases by a ﬁxed increment
∆ (where ∆ should be thought of as small).16
14Such investments for example include the resources spent to assess the synergies with the assets already
owned.
15In case of ties, each one of the bidders with highest bid gets the object with equal probability.
16This assumption can be viewed as a way to break ties when more than one bidder is willing to drop out
at the same price. It also ensures that in each step of the auction, the number of active bidders cannot drop
8Bidders are assumed to observe the number of bidders still active in the auction. This
number will be denoted by m. The auction ends when there is only one bidder left. The
object is allocated to that bidder at the current price. Besides observing the price p,t h e
number of active bidder m, and whether they are given the option to drop out, they do not
observe anything else.
Information acquisition. In the second price auction, each bidder decides prior to the auc-
tion whether or not to acquire information. In the ascending price auction, each uninformed
bidder may decide to learn his valuation not only before the auction starts (before t =0 ),
but also during the auction (prior to each date t =1 ,...). Learning one’s own valuation costs
c. The length of time required to acquire information is assumed to be no larger than the
lapse of time between two dates. That is, if a bidder decides to learn his valuation prior
to date t, we assume that this information is available at date t (see subsection 5.1 for on
elaboration on this). The decision to acquire information is not observable to other bidders.
To simplify exposition, when a bidder acquires information right before date t,w ew i l lw r i t e
that he acquires information at t−. For convenience, when the price that will prevail at t is
equal to p and the bidder acquires information at t−, we write that he acquires information
at p−.17
Preliminaries.
The above descriptions of the rules of the auctions, the information acquisition technology,
the information and payoﬀ structures deﬁne games for the sealed bid second-price auction
and the ascending price auction. In the sealed-bid auction, a bidder’s strategy is described
by more than one. Note that bidders who did not get the option to drop out are not disadvantaged however,
because when the auction resumes, the price has not changed and they may still be given the option to drop
o u ta tt h a ts a m ep r i c e .
An alternative assumption would be that the auction stops when all still active bidders want to exit simul-
taneously, and that each one of these bidders has an equal chance of being awarded the object. In the absence
of an option to acquire information, the two formulations would be equivalent. In the presence of an option to
acquire information, our formulation gives bidders who were not given an option to drop out an extra chance
of acquiring information.
17Note that since the price does not always rise, the latter notation may introduce some ambiguity about
the date before which information acquisition occurs. In these cases, specifying the number of active bidders
will leave out any such ambiguity.
9by a probability of information acquisition (when uninformed) and a bid contingent on the
available information to him (i.e. whether or not he is informed, and the realization of his
valuation when informed).
In the ascending price auction, the behavioral strategy of bidder i is deﬁned as a function
of the (private) history hi observed by bidder i up to the current date t where hi stands for
the sequence of prices ps,t h en u m b e rms of active bidders for each earlier date s<tand
whether or not bidder i was given an option to drop out at s and whether or not bidder i
acquired information at s− (when still uninformed ).18 The behavioral strategy of bidder i
speciﬁes for each hi a probability of information acquisition at t− (when still uninformed)
and a probability of dropping out if given the option to at t (whether or not he is informed).
Throughout the paper, we investigate properties of trembling-hand perfect equilibria with
uncorrelated trembles at the various information sets (Selten 1975).19 We start by stating
a few preliminary results, and by introducing further notations. The main challenge will be
to evaluate the information acquisition strategy of the uninformed bidders in the ascending
auction (i.e. if and when bidders acquire information), as once a bidder is informed, his
strategy is rather standard (see below).
Existence.
First, we observe that in each format, an equilibrium exists. This is immediate in the
static auction, since bidders have a dominant strategy (concerning bidding), i.e. bidding θi
if informed, v if uninformed, and information acquisition is a 0−1 decision. In the dynamic
auction, once the price rises above ¯ θ, it is a dominant strategy for any still active bidder
to drop out. So there is only a ﬁnite number of histories after which behavior needs to be
determined. Since there are only a ﬁnite number of types and the action space of every bidder
is ﬁnite after every history, the existence of a trembling-hand equilibrium follows from Kreps
and Wilson (1982).
Informed bidders’ strategies.
The behavior of informed bidders is fairly standard in the static sealed-bid second-price
auction: each informed bidder submits a bid equal to his valuation. In the dynamic auction,
18T h el a s tt w oe l e m e n t so fhi are private information to bidder i.
19Technically, this amounts to looking at the trembling-and perfect equilibria in the agent form representa-
tion of the game. (see, for example, the deﬁnition in Fudenberg and Tirole 1991)
10and because price increments are discrete, dominance arguments do not pin down the strategy
of the informed bidders. Yet, standard dominance arguments deliver:
Proposition 1 In any equilibrium of the dynamic format, an informed bidder with valuation
θ drops out at some price p no larger than θ + ∆ and no smaller than θ − ∆.
As the price increment gets small, the behavior of informed bidders is almost determined
by Proposition 1.
Uninformed bidders and the gains from information acquisition.
To assess uninformed bidders’ incentives to acquire information, we introduce the follow-
ing notation.
First, for any price p ∈ [0,¯ θ],w ed e ﬁne:
h(p)=Eθi max(θi − p,0).( 3 )
h(p) corresponds to the expected payoﬀ bidder i would obtain if he were to learn (for free)
his valuation θi and were oﬀered to buy at price p.
We next deﬁne functions that will allow us to derive a lower bound on the gains made
by an uninformed bidder should he acquire information when there is only one other active
bidder and the current price is p.W el e t
H∆(p)=E[h(θ + ∆) | θ >p+ ∆],
















which will be relevant for the case in which the other bidder wishes to drop out.20
20If bidder i stays in whenever θi ≥ p, he wins the object at price p with probability one if θi ≥ p (because
the other drops out), and with probability
1
2 otherwise (because there is a
1
2 chance that the other bidder is
given the option to drop out ﬁrst.
11Observe that the functions H∆ and G are decreasing in their arguments.21
Finally, we let
e H∆(p) ≡ min(H∆(p) − ∆,G(p))
and deﬁne p∗ to be the largest price p, multiple of ∆,22 for which e H∆(p) >c+∆. Throughout
the paper, we shall assume that:23
Assumption 1 c + ∆ < e H∆(v + ∆).
This assumption guarantees that there are some gains to information acquisition when
there are two bidders in competition. Speciﬁcally,
Claim A: Under Assumption 1, in equilibrium, in events where the current price
is p− with p ∈ (v − ∆,p ∗) and m =2 , any still uninformed bidder acquires
information and obtains a payoﬀ at least equal to H∆(p) − c>0.
To prove this Claim, we ﬁrst show that in equilibrium, once there are only two bidders
active in the auction, and the current price lies above v, then any still uninformed bidder
either drops out or acquires information immediately.
Lemma 1 Assume that c<G (v).24 Consider any event where the current price is p− >v
and m =2 . Then in equilibrium, any still uninformed bidder either drops out at p without
acquiring information, or he acquires information immediately.
The intuition for the result is as follows. If bidder i is supposed to drop out without
acquiring information, then the earlier the better because, since p>v , this would allow
21Indeed, h
0(p)=−Pr{θi >p } ∈ (−1,0).S o G is decreasing. Now choose p
0 >pand let Q =P r {θ ∈
(p + ∆,p
0 + ∆) | θ >p+ ∆}. We have
H∆(p) >Q h (p
0 + ∆)+( 1− Q)H∆(p
0) >H ∆(p
0)
22Only prices that are multiples of ∆ may be reached.
23This assumption ensures that p
∗ >v . To hold for some c and ∆ suﬃciently small, it is suﬃcient that
there exist at least two types θ
k,θ
k+1 lying above v. Indeed, for ∆ small enough, θ
k >v+2 ∆ and θ
k+1 >
θ
k + ∆. T h i si m p l i e st h a th(θ
k + ∆) ≥ f(θ
k+1)(θ
k+1 − θ
k − ∆) and H∆(v + ∆) ≥ f(θ
k)h(θ
k + ∆),h e n c e
H∆(v + ∆) lies above c + ∆ for c and ∆ small enough.
24This is implied by Assumption 1.
12him to avoid acquiring the object at a loss. Delaying information acquisition is not a good
strategy either. When bidder i postpones information acquisition till the price reaches p0 >p ,
he avoids the information acquisition cost in the event the other bidder drops out between p
and p0. However, by acquiring information right away, and in case θi <v , he may drop out
(if given the option to), and save at least 1
2E[v − θi | θi <v ]=G(v). We provide a formal
proof in the Appendix.
The second step consists in deriving a lower bound on the equilibrium payoﬀ obtained
from acquiring information when there is one other active bidder. Deﬁne the continuation
strategy σ∗
p,d e ﬁned from the current price p−, as follows: acquire information immediately,
and for any l ≥ 0, drop out at pl = p + l∆ where pl − ∆ < θ ≤ pl (if given the option to).25
We have:
Lemma 2 In the ascending price auction, consider the event where m =2 , the current price
is p−, p>v− ∆, and bidder i is still active and uninformed. Then bidder i can secure a
payoﬀ at least equal to e H∆(p) − c by following σ∗
p.
Roughly, G(p)−c corresponds to a lower bound from using σ∗
p when facing a bidder who
wishes to drop out, while H(p)−c corresponds to a lower bound from using σ∗
p when facing
a bidder willing to remain active (thus informed by Lemma 1). So whether bidder i is facing
an uninformed bidder (who by Lemma 1 either drops out or acquires information), or an
informed bidder, bidder i is able to secure e H∆(p)−c by following σ∗
p. The details of the proof
are in the Appendix.
We can now turn to the proof of Claim A:
P r o o fo fC l a i mA :This Claim is a simple consequence of Lemma 1 and 2: under
Assumption 1, bidder i can secure a payoﬀ larger than ∆ by following σ∗
p. It follows that
dropping out is dominated (since it yields at most ∆). Hence in equilibrium, by Lemma 1,
bidder i must acquire information, and thus he obtains at least what he can get by following
σ∗
p,t h a ti s , e H∆(p) − c. Q.E.D.
25Typically, σ
∗
p will not be an equilibrium strategy. However, it permits us to derive a lower bound on the
payoﬀ a bidder can obtain when he acquires information.
133 Wait-and-see and information acquisition.
This Section illustrates that the incentives for information acquisition are very diﬀerent in the
sealed-bid and the ascending bid auction formats. Uninformed bidders will typically acquire
information more often in the ascending price auction than in the sealed-bid auction, at least
when the number of bidders is not too small. We will also illustrate that uninformed bidders
may stay active in the ascending price auction much above their expected valuation. These
two features will be exploited in the next section to establish that the ascending price auction
generates more revenues than the sealed-bid auction when there are suﬃciently many bidders.
Our ﬁrst result concerns the sealed-bid second price auction.
Proposition 2 Fix c>0 and consider the sealed-bid second price auction in the symmetric
case. Then when n is large enough, uninformed bidders do not acquire information, and
accordingly they bid their expected valuation v.
Intuitively, when bidder i acquires information at cost c, he obtains h(p) in the event the
price turns out to be p. When there are many bidders the distribution over price puts most
weight on high values of p.A n df o rh i g hv a l u e so fp, h(p) is close to 0. As a consequence, this
gain does not compensate the cost c of information acquisition, and there is no information
acquisition in equilibrium.26
We now turn to the ascending price auction.
Proposition 3 Assume that c+∆ < e H∆(v +∆). Then, in equilibrium, information acqui-
sition occurs with positive probability in the ascending auction.
So, unlike in the second price auction for which information acquisition cannot occur
when there are many bidders, in the ascending price auction, information acquisition always
occurs with positive probability, even as the number of bidders gets very large.
The intuition for this diﬀerence is that, in the sealed bid auction, acquiring information
costs c whether competition turns out to be ﬁerce or not, i.e. whether the selling price
26Formally, an upperbound on the gain from information acquisition is
E[h(θ
(1))] − c,
which tends to −c when n gets large.
14p turns out to be large or not. In contrast, in the ascending price auction, bidders see
the number of competitors who are still active. Hence they can condition their decision to
acquire information on the strength of competition. In particular, there is always a chance
that competition turns out to be weak.27 So information acquisition occurs with positive
probability, even as the number of bidders gets arbitrarily large.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 :Assume by contradiction that information acquisition occurs
with probability 0. This implies that any uninformed bidder drops out as soon as p>v .
Consider the event where n1 = n − 1,a n dθ(2) <v− ∆ and v + ∆ < θ(1). Under that event,
the auction continues until some price p ∈ (v − ∆,v] at which m =2 . By Claim A, the
uninformed bidder should then acquire information, yielding a contradiction. Q.E.D.
Another implication of Claim A is that, in the ascending price auction, uninformed bidders
may ﬁnd it proﬁtable to remain active above v, whether or not they eventually acquire
information and irrespective of the number of bidders. This is because an uninformed bidder
has the option to wait and see whether or not competition turns out to be weak. And he
can do so at absolutely no (expected) cost until the price reaches p∗ where p∗ >v(see
above). Indeed, he can always decide to acquire information if at some price p<p ∗ he faces
a single other bidder, and to drop out at p∗ otherwise. Such a strategy guarantees a positive
(expected) payoﬀ by Claim A.
Proposition 4 Assume c + ∆ < e H∆(v + ∆). Then, in equilibrium, as long as there are at
least two active bidders (m ≥ 2) and the next current price is no larger than p∗ (p ≤ p∗), any
still uninformed bidder either acquires information, or he remains active in the auction.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 :First, we show that in any event where the next current price
is p ≤ p∗ and m ≥ 2, a still uninformed bidder has a strategy that yields a strictly positive
payoﬀ. This will imply that dropping out is a dominated strategy, showing that he either
acquires information or remains active without acquiring information.
Deﬁne the following wait-and-see strategy: wait until either m =2or p = p∗. Then, in
case m =2arises before p = p∗, follow the information acquisition strategy σ∗
p. Otherwise,
choose to drop out. In case one other bidder is also willing to drop out and given the option
27This chance remains positive no matter how many bidders are ex ante around (yet it typically decreases
with this number).
15to drop out ﬁrst, continue to try dropping out until either given the option to, or m =2 .
In the latter case, follow σ∗
p. Because (in the game with trembles) there is always a positive
chance that the number of active bidders drops down to 2 w i t h o u ta n yp r i c ei n c r e a s e ,t h i s
strategy yields a strictly positive payoﬀ by Claim A.
Dropping out, which yields 0,i st h u sd o m i n a t e d .Q.E.D.
Comment: To conclude this Section, let us emphasize that Proposition 4 does not pro-
vide a full characterization of equilibrium behavior. It only provides an important feature of
equilibrium behavior that will be suﬃcient to compare revenues across formats. In an earlier
version of this paper, we were able to provide a full characterization of equilibrium behavior,
in the “special case” where ∆ is arbitrarily small and the number of initially uninformed bid-
ders is known to be equal to 1. In that case, we can prove that the uninformed bidder does not
acquire information unless m =2 . In the general case, the information acquisition strategy
can be quite complex. For the sake of illustration, consider an uninformed bidder, say bidder
i: if other uninformed bidders acquire information early on, then bidder i will typically be
tempted to wait until m =2to acquire information (as if there were only informed bidders).
However, if many bidders wait for m =2or some price e p to acquire information, then there
is a gain to acquiring information beforehand, because it reduces the risk of being stuck with
the object (in the event the remaining bidders are all uninformed bidders and willing to drop
o u ta tt h es a m ep r i c ee p). So typically, in equilibrium, the information acquisition strategy
will involve mixed strategies.
4 Revenues.
The following result establishes a revenue ranking between our two auction formats when
there are suﬃciently many bidders.
Proposition 5 Consider the symmetric case and any n large enough. Then for ∆ small
enough, revenues in the ascending auction are larger than in the second price auction.
Revenues increase through two channels: (i) There is more information acquisition in the
ascending price auction (as Propositions 2 and 3 illustrate); (ii) Uninformed bidders who do
16not acquire information remain active in the ascending price auction beyond their expected
valuation for the object, thereby making the winner pay a higher price (see Proposition 4).
Concerning the ﬁrst channel, note that ap r i o r ithe eﬀect of information acquisition on
revenues is ambiguous. For example, under the event where there is a single uninformed bidder
and θ(1) <v .Then information acquisition by the uninformed bidder decreases revenues:
without information acquisition, revenue is θ(1); with information acquisition, the revenue
cannot be larger, but it can be smaller (if the uninformed bidder learns that his valuation is
actually below θ(1)).
For large enough number of bidders however, the eﬀect of information acquisition is
positive because then, on average, such events where the revenues decrease due to information
acquisition by uninformed bidders have a small probability (compared to the events where
the eﬀect on revenues is positive).
We provide a full proof in the Appendix. Here we suggest some intuition for the result
by considering the case where the distribution over (n1,n 2) is concentrated (i.e. puts almost
all weight) on some ﬁxed (n0
1,n 0
2). We will distinguish two cases: the case where n0
2 is large
(which will allow us to quantify the wait and see eﬀect), and the case where n0
2 is small (which
will allow us to quantify the information acquisition eﬀect).28
Consider ﬁrst the case of a large n0
2: Let us focus on events where competition is not too
ﬁerce, that is, events where θ(2) <p ∗.29 Under these events, revenue in the static auction
cannot be larger than max(v,θ(2)). Now observe that in the ascending auction, either at
least n0
2 − 1 uninformed bidders acquire information, in which case the price must rise to
at least θ(3)
u ; or at least two uninformed bidders do not acquire information, in which case,
by proposition 4, price must raise to p∗ at least. When there are many initially uninformed
bidder (i.e. n0
2 large), the event where θ(3)
u is below p∗ has a vanishing probability. Therefore,
in expectation, as n0
2 gets large, the ascending auction generates a gain in revenue at least
equal to
Pr(θ(2) <p ∗)E[p∗ − max(v,θ(2)) | θ(2) <p ∗]. (4)
28In the rest of this Section, to simplify presentation of the intuition, we consider the case in which ∆ is
arbitrarily small.
29In events where θ
(2) is larger than p
∗, revenue is equal to θ
(2) in the static auction, and it cannot be
smaller in the dynamic auction, whether uninformed bidders acquire information or not.
17This expression captures (and provides a lower bound on) the wait and see eﬀect.30
Consider next the case of a small n0
2. The argument above cannot be applied, because
then there may be a substantial probability that all bidders acquire information and all learn
that their valuation is below v. Depending on the value of θ(2),t h ee ﬀect on revenue may be
negative or positive. If θ(2) is below v, information acquisition may then decrease revenues.
If however θ(2) is above v, then information acquisition cannot hurt, because revenue will still
be at least equal to θ(2) and possibly more when some bidders learn that their valuation is
above θ(2). In expectation, when n0
1 gets large, the event θ(2) <vis much less likely than the
event θ(2) ∈ (v,p∗),a n dt h ee ﬀect on revenues is thus positive.
5 Discussion
5.1 Multi-stage mechanisms.
Although our analysis has assumed that information acquisition may occur instantaneously all
along the ascending price auction, our insight that dynamic auctions dominate static auctions
would carry over to a wide range of mechanisms and information acquisition technologies.
The key features of the dynamic format and the information acquisition technology that we
have been exploiting is that contestants get feedback about the state of competition in the
course of the procedure, and that they have enough time to use that feedback to adjust their
information acquisition strategy.
Our insight may thus account for the prevalence of multi-stage mechanisms in which the
number of contestants is reduced from one stage to another and enough time is given between
the various stages so that contestants can eﬀectively reﬁne the estimate of their valuations.
As an illustration, let us brieﬂy examine a selling procedure that consists of the following
two stages: the ﬁrst stage is a sealed-bid auction. The two bidders with highest bid are
selected to participate in the second stage. Before the start of the second stage, acquisition
of information may occur. The second stage is a second price auction where bidders submit
ab i dp0
i required to be at least as large as the third largest bid of the ﬁrst stage. We have:
30Note that we omit here the additional eﬀect from information acquisition, as eventually, the number of
active bidders will drop down, and eventually uninformed bidders will acquire information, generating further
gains in revenues.
18Claim B: In equilibrium, uninformed bidders submit a bid at least equal to p∗
in the ﬁrst stage. If the third bid in the ﬁrst stage belongs to [v,p∗] and an
uninformed bidder is selected for the second stage, he acquires information.
P r o o fo fC l a i mB :Denote by p(3) the third largest bid in stage 1. Denote by η∗ the
strategy of an uninformed bidder in stage 2 which consists in acquiring information if p(3) ≥ v
(and then bidding max(p(3),θ) in stage 2), and bidding v without acquiring information if
p(3) <v . For any p(3) ≤ p∗, this strategy generates a strictly positive payoﬀ (this follows
from Claim A).
Assume now that in equilibrium, an uninformed bidder, say bidder i,b i d sp<p ∗ in stage
1;l e tσ(p(3)) denote his continuation strategy, as a function of p(3), and denote by b v(p(3)) the
corresponding (continuation) equilibrium payoﬀ.S i n c ep(3) ≤ p<p ∗ when i is selected, we
know that b v(p(3)) must be strictly positive (otherwise η∗ would be a proﬁtable deviation). We
also know that if p(3) ≥ v, σ(p(3)) must involve acquiring information (because not acquiring
information yields a non-positive payoﬀ).
Now consider the deviation that consists in bidding p∗, and then following σ(p(3)) in
events where p(3) ≤ p, and following η∗ in events where p(3) >p .
This deviation generates the same expected payoﬀ in events where p(3) <por where
p(3) = p and bidder i was selected to participate in the second stage. In the event p(3) >p ,
the gain is positive by the above argument. Finally, in the event p(3) = p and bidder i was
not selected to participate, the gain is also positive because either p<vand both strategies
(acquisition or no acquisition) yield a positive payoﬀ,o rp ≥ v,a n di tm u s tb et h a tσ(p(3))
prescribes to acquire information, and thus bidder i gets a positive payoﬀ (by claim A). So
the deviation is proﬁtable, yielding a contradiction. The second part of the claim follows
from Claim A. Q.E.D.
5.2 Revenues: A numerical example
Proposition 5 is silent about the number of bidders suﬃcient to get an increase in revenues.
It is also silent about the magnitude of the eﬀects. We attempt to remedy this by looking
at a numerical case. We assume that each θi is drawn from the uniform distribution on
19[0,1].31 We choose a cost of information acquisition equal to 5% of the expected value, that





1 =5 ,i . e .5 initially informed bidders, uninformed bidders have no incentives to
acquire information. Besides, under the assumptions above we have:32
p∗ =0 .55
that is, uninformed bidders are ready to remain active at least 10% above their expected
valuation without acquiring information. With a large number of uninformed bidders, these
wait and see strategies alone generate an increase in revenue at least equal to 2.8%,aﬁgure
obtained by evaluating expression (4).
5.3 The role of information transmission
An important feature of the ascending price auction is that in the course of the auction,
bidders learn about the number of bidders who are still interested in the object. (This is also
true, though to a lesser degree, in the two-stage variant mentioned above.) To illustrate why
this feature of the ascending format is important, we now brieﬂye x a m i n et h eascending price
auction with secret drop out. The auction is identical to the ascending auction, except that
bidders do not observe whether and when other bidders drop out until the auction gets to a
complete end (i.e. until there is only one bidder left).
Consider the case where n is large enough so that,
E[h(θ(1))] − c<0. (5)
which implies that in the static auction, uninformed bidders do not acquire information in
equilibrium (see Section 3).
Claim C: When condition (5) holds, then, in the ascending price auction with
secret drop out, it is an equilibrium for uninformed bidders not to acquire infor-
mation.
31More precisely, we consider the uniform distribution over {0,1/K,...,k/K,...,1}, and we consider the case
where K is very large.
32With a uniform distribution, h(p)=( 1− p)
2/2,a n df o rc =0 .025,p
∗ is determined by the equality
(1/2 − p)+( 1− p)
2/2=2 c.
20Intuitively, learning that the price continues to raise may only be bad news. When there
are no other uninformed bidders (n2 =1 ), or when p>v , observing the current price p
signals that θ(1) >p , and it is readily veriﬁed that
E[h(θ(1)) | θ(1) >p ] <E [h(θ(1))].
And when n2 ≥ 2 and p ≤ v, observing the current price p conveys no information. It
follows that when condition (5) is met acquiring information yields a negative expected payoﬀ
whatever the current price. Hence, there is no information acquisition in equilibrium.
Rezende (2005) in an independent work studies the ascending price auction with secret
drop-out in a model where information acquisition costs may be arbitrarily small and hetero-
geneous among bidders. He shows that when the number of bidders is suﬃciently large, the
revenues generated by this auction is greater than the revenues generated by the sealed-bid
second price auction. At ﬁrst glance, Rezende’s ﬁnding seems to contradict the message of
claim C. Note however that in Rezende’s setting there is always some amount of information
acquisition, even in the sealed-bid auction (because information acquisition costs may be
arbitrarily small). If these costs could not be arbitrarily small, the same insight as in claim
C would arise even with heterogeneous costs.
Another important observation is that Rezende’s insight entirely hinges on the feature
that information acquisition costs need not be paid in case a bidder wins the auction. It
is the prospect of buying the object without having to pay for the information acquisition
cost that leads bidders to postpone the point at which they acquire information in Rezende’s
auction format.33 In a number of applications though, it seems natural to assume that these
costs have to be paid anyway by the winning bidder (see the Remark after the description of
the model). In such applications, the ascending price auction with secret drop out would lead
bidders willing to acquire information to do so at the start of the auction, and thus this format
would be equivalent to the sealed-bid second price auction. By contrast, our main insight
does not hinge on this feature: In our setup, it is the prospect of a higher chance of winning
(as revealed by the number of active bidders) that leads bidders to acquire information more
often in the ascending price auction.
33It also leads some bidders who would not acquire information in the sealed-bid format to acquire infor-
mation in Rezende’s ascending format.
21Finally, note that other variants of the ascending price auction include the possibility (see
Harstad and Rothkopf 2000 and Izmalkov 2003) that bidders might re-enter after dropping
out.34 In such formats, the observation that there are few bidders around may not be as
reliable as in the ascending format analyzed in Sections 2 to 4, and it seems likely that such
formats will generate less information acquisition than the one studied here.
5.4 Multi-object auctions.
While our formal analysis has been based on a single object problem, we show in Compte-
Jehiel 2002a (in a simple model) that our basic insight carries over to multi-object auctions. In
these auctions, not only do bidders have to decide whether or not to acquire extra information;
but when they do so, they have to decide on which object to acquire information. This suggests
that ascending formats that generate information on which object a bidder has better chances
of winning are likely to perform better than formats such as static ones that do not generate
such information: when a bidder is not guided as to which object(s) to focus on, he takes poor
information acquisition decisions, which in turn is likely to discourage him from acquiring
any information. In contrast, when a bidder is guided as to which objects he should focus
on, he makes good information acquisition decisions, which in turn leads him to acquire
extra information more often. Such a principle may guide the practitioner in his choice of
activity rule (see Ausubel and Milgrom 2001 for an account of why this may be of practical
importance in package auctions.)
5.5 The continuum type case
Our assumptions that price increases by increments and that valuations can only take a ﬁnite
number of values allowed us to show the existence of equilibrium using standard existence
results. This subsection discusses the existence issue when there is a continuum of valuations
θi.35 Note that the main diﬃculty is about determining the equilibrium strategy of bidders
who know their valuations θi.36 With a continuum of types, existence results can be found
in the literature for static games of incomplete information (see, in particular, Athey 2001).
34Alternatively, bidders may sometimes have the possibility to hide that they are still around.
35We do not discuss the case in which the price increases continuously.
36There is only type of uninformed bidders, and since the number of (relevant) histories is ﬁnite there is no
problem dealing with them.
22Similar ideas can be transposed to our multi-stage framework. The key idea would be to
show that informed bidders’ optimal response (to any strategy proﬁle of other bidders) is a
threshold strategy. That is, if it is optimal for bidder i with valuation θi to remain active
at some stage, then a fortiori, it should be optimal for bidder i with valuations θ0
i > θi to
remain active as well. Such a monotonicity property is referred to as single-crossing in the
literature, and whenever it holds, every informed bidder i’s strategy can be summarized by a
scalar. This in turn ensures that standard ﬁxed point theorems can be used to establish the
existence of an equilibrium (see Athey 2001).37
As a matter of fact, in the context of the ascending price auction as described in Section 2,
there is no problem applying that technique. Bidder i with valuation θi has to compare (after
some history) the value derived from remaining active to the value derived from dropping
out (which is 0). It can easily be proved that the value derived from remaining active is an
increasing function of the valuation θi,38 so the diﬀerence in the value derived from these two
options (remaining active or dropping out) is also increasing in θi. So the optimal response
necessarily takes the form of a threshold strategy.
Finally, let us emphasize that our result does not require pinning down exactly the be-
havior of informed bidders. The reason is that as ∆ tends to 0, the behavior of informed
bidders is almost entirely determined by dominance arguments (see Proposition 1). We thus
conjecture that our result would continue to hold for weaker solution concepts, such as ones
based on a few rounds of elimination of dominated strategies.
37When this single crossing property holds, a bidder’s optimal threshold varies continuously with the thresh-
olds used by others. Existence then follows because there is a ﬁnite number of possible histories (price in-
crements are discrete, and after a while, it is a dominant strategy to drop out), hence a ﬁnite number of
thresholds.
38The reason is as follows. Consider an history of the game for player i, and any continuation strategy σ
involving remaining active at the current date. If bidder i with valuation θi obtains the object with probability
p and makes an expected payment t by following σ, thereby obtaining an expected payoﬀ equal to θip − t,
then bidder i with valuation θ
0
i,b yf o l l o w i n gσ can secure an expected payoﬀ equal to θ
0
ip − t. Because we
consider trembling hand equilibria, p>0, and thus the value is strictly increasing in θi.
235.6 Dynamic screening.
We conclude by taking a broader perspective, and we consider the more general issue of how
one should organize screening among agents who may acquire further information about their
types.
From a general Principal-Agent perspective, we have dealt with a setting in which a
principal (the seller) attempts to screen among agents (potential buyers) who may acquire
information about their types (valuations), or invest so as to aﬀect their types (as in the
alternative formulation — see expression (2) in Section 2), prior to signing a contract (the
sale). As in our sale example, the principal may ﬁnd it desirable to provide agents with
incentives to acquire information or invest prior to signing a contract, because this improves
the chance of selecting a more able agent; that is, an agent with a better type (See Compte-
Jehiel 2002b). In this context, our analysis suggests that a dynamic screening procedure,
that leaves the competing agents some time to acquire information about their types, would
outperform static screening procedures.39
Another example along these lines is the case of a sponsor who wishes to induce poten-
tial contestants (and possibly the ablest one) to exert high research eﬀort. When research
outcomes are not measurable or contractible, one option for the sponsor is to organize a
tournament in which the winner gets a ﬁxed prize. As mentioned in the introduction, in-
ducing high research eﬀort is sometimes more economically achieved by reducing the number
of contestants (rather than increasing the prize). In such settings, it is important for the
sponsor to screen among potential contestants so as to induce the participation of the ablest
ones only.40
How should one organize screening? This issue is of primary importance, as failing to
39Cremer and Khalil (1992) consider a principal-agent setup in which the agent can learn his type before
signing the contract. Most of their analysis bears on the one-agent case in which no screening is needed (their
main insight is that the principal should not induce the agent to learn his type before the contract is signed).
In the multi-agent section of their paper, Cremer and Khalil restrict attention to contracts in which the agents
do not have incentives to learn their type. However, (unlike in the one-agent case) such contracts need not be
optimal.
40When contestants have identical abilities (as in Che and Gale), this can easily be achieved by a random
selection fo a subset of contestants. However, when they are not ex ante identical, a ﬁner screening device is
required.
24screen good contestants may jeopardize the success of the tournament, and Fullerton and
McAfee have identiﬁed why some screening procedures (that would auction rights to partic-
ipate in the tournament) could fail to screen properly.41
Though screening is often thought of as a pure adverse selection problem, it seems plausi-
ble that some contestants may only have a rough idea of how successful their research eﬀort
will be, and that by investing a bit prior to the tournament, they could have a much better
idea of how able they are. Besides, the sponsor could clearly beneﬁt from such investments,
since this should help him select the truly ablest contestants. Here again, a dynamic screening
procedure would outperform static screening procedures.42
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28Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :Consider p<θ − ∆. By remaining active and waiting p + ∆ to
drop out, a bidder with valuation θ gets a non-negative payoﬀ in the event the price rises
to p + ∆, and he gets a positive payoﬀ in the event the price does not rise. Since the latter
event has positive probability (in the game with trembles), dropping out at p<θ − ∆ is a
dominated strategy.
Consider p>θ and assume bidder i is given the option to drop out. Bidder i obtains 0
by dropping out. If he remains active, there is a positive chance (in the game with trembles)
that bidder i will eventually get the object (thus at a loss). So remaining active at p>θ is
a dominated strategy. So it cannot be that in a trembling hand perfect equilibrium, bidder
i with valuation θ drops out at some price p>θ + ∆ (he drops out earlier).
Proof of Lemma 1: Consider the event where at price p−, there are two bidders left
(m =2 ), and one bidder, say bidder i is still uninformed. Conditional on this event, we let
φl , l ≥ 0, denote the (equilibrium) probability that his opponent drops out at pl = p + l∆
(if given the option to drop out)43. Assume by contradiction that in equilibrium, bidder i
has incentives to acquire information at p−
l+1,a n dl e tσ(θi) denote the strategy followed by
bidder i once he learns his valuation θi. Assume that instead, bidder i acquires information
at p−
l , and then depending on the realization of θi:e i t h e rθi ≤ v, and he drops out at pl
if given that option, or he remains active one more period (at least) and follows σ(θi) at
pl+1 otherwise. In expectation, this alternative strategy generates an extra acquisition cost,
equal to φlc (because by waiting p−
l+1 to acquire information, with probability φl, bidder i’s
opponent would have dropped out and bidder i would have avoided acquiring information).
However, under that event where bidder i0s opponent drops out at pl if given that option, and
under the event where θi <v , bidder i saves v − θi with probability 1/2, so in expectation,







which is greater than φlc by assumption. So it is a proﬁtable deviation, hence it cannot be
43If the opponent is not given the option to drop out, it must be because bidder i was given that option
before and decided to drop out.
44Bidder i also gains under the event where the opponent drops out pl+1, because acquiring information at
p
−
l allows him to drop out before his opponent.
29that bidder i acquires information at p−
l+1 with positive probability. (Note that in the game
with trembles φl is positive for all l).
Similarly, assume by contradiction that in equilibrium, bidder i has incentives to drop
out at pl+1 (without having acquired information before). By dropping at pl instead, bidder
i would save
pl−v
2 in the event the opponent was willing to drop out at pl,a n d
pl+1−v
2 in the
event the opponent was willing to drop out at pl+1. So again, this is a proﬁtable deviation.
It cannot be that bidder i drops out at pl+1 with positive probability.
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 : Under the conditions of Lemma 1, assume that bidder i follows σ∗
p.
Since p + ∆ >v , we know from Lemma 1 that the other bidder, say bidder j,m u s te i t h e r
have dropped out by p +∆ (that is, at p or p+∆) or he must have acquired information by
p + ∆. We derive bounds in each case.
In case bidder j drops out at p, bidder i gets at least G(p). Indeed, in the event θi <p ,
both bidders wish to drop out (if given the option), hence bidder i has a chance 1/2 of getting
the object, so he gets (θi − p)/2 in expectation; and in the event θi >p , bidder i remains
active and obtains the object at price p.
Similarly, in case bidder j drops out at price pl, l ≥ 1, bidder i (who drops out at pl0 if








(θk − pl)f(θk) ≥ h(pl) − ∆/2
We use this lower bound to deal with the case where bidder j is informed at p or gets
informed at p + ∆.
(a) If bidder j has a valuation θ <p+ ∆, he either drops out at p, in which case bidder
i gets G(p),o rh ed r o p so u ta tp + ∆, in which case bidder i gets at least h(p + ∆) − ∆/2,
which is larger than H∆(p) − ∆/2 (because h(.) is decreasing).
(b) If bidder j has a valuation θ >p+∆, bidder j drops out at some price pl with l ≥ 1,
with pl ≤ θ + ∆.T h u s , s i n c e h(.) is decreasing, bidder i obtains a payoﬀ at least equal
h(θ + ∆) − ∆/2, hence at least equal to H∆(p) − ∆/2 in expectation.Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 :In what follows, we denote by n1 (respectively n2)t h en u m b e r
of initially informed (respectively initially uninformed) bidders, and, in case n2 ≥ 1,a n d
remember that θ(1)
u (respectively θ(2)
u ) denotes the largest (respectively second largest) valu-
ation among the initially uninformed bidders (in case n2 ≤ 1,w es e tθ(2)
u =0 ). We denote
30by Rs (respectively Rd) the realized revenue in the static auction (respectively the dynamic
auction). We also let b p =( v + p∗)/2.
We are going to show that for any n large enough, we can choose ∆ small enough so that
the expected diﬀerence Rd −Rs is strictly positive (and bounded away from 0 as ∆ tends to
0).
Step 1:W eﬁrst identify events in which revenue decreases by no more than ∆.T h a ti s ,
consider the events B0 = {n2 =0 } and B1 = {n2 ≥ 1,θ(2) ≥ v or θ(2)
u ≥ v}. We show that in
any event in B0 ∪ B1 t h el o s si sa tm o s t∆,i . e .
Rd − Rs ≥− ∆
Under B0, all bidders are informed. Thus Rs = θ(2). Since, in the ascending auction,
any informed bidder i remains active until θi − ∆ at least, we have Rd ≥ θ(2) − ∆, hence
Rd − Rs ≥− ∆.
Under B1, uninformed bidders bid v i nt h es t a t i ca u c t i o n ,s ow eh a v eRs ≤ max(v,θ(2)).
In the ascending price auction, Proposition 4 shows that any uninformed bidder i either
acquires information (and does not drop out before θi−∆) or he remains active until at least
p∗. So, either all uninformed bidders eventually acquire information, in which case revenue
is at least equal to max(θ(2),θ(2)
u )−∆, or at least one uninformed bidder remains active until
p∗, in which case revenues is at least equal to max(θ(2),p ∗).I ne i t h e rc a s e ,Rd − Rs ≥− ∆.
Step 2: We now identify events under which the gain is substantial. That is, consider
the event C = {θ(2) ∈ [v, b p],n 2 ≥ 1} and the event D = {n2 ≥ 1,θ(2) <v ,θ(2)
u >p ∗}.A l s o
let rC =[ 1− F(p∗)]2(p∗ − b p) and rD =[ 1− F(p∗)](p∗ − v). We show that for X = C or D:
E[Rd − Rs | X] ≥ rX − ∆
Under C, Rs = θ(2) ≤ b p. Now conditional on C, the event where θ(1) >p ∗ and one
uninformed bidder has a valuation at least equal to p∗, has strictly positive probability, at
least equal to [1−F(p∗)]2. Under the latter event, either all uninformed acquire information,
and price rises until p∗ at least, or one uninformed bidder does not acquire information, but
by Proposition 4, and since θ(1) >p ∗, he must be remaining active until p∗.I ne i t h e rc a s e ,
Rd ≥ p∗ − ∆.S i n c eC ⊂ B1, it follows that
E[Rd − Rs | C] ≥ [1 − F(p∗)]2(p∗ − b p)+( 1− [1 − F(p∗)]2)(−∆) ≥ rC − ∆.
31Under D, Rs ≤ v. Now conditional on D, consider the event where θ(1) >p ∗. (This event
has probability at least equal to 1 − F(p∗)). Under that event, price rises up to p∗ at least,
hence revenue increases by at least p∗ − b p, which concludes step 2 since D ⊂ B1.
Final step: There are events where revenues may decrease (by more than ∆). By step
1, this may only happen under event A = {θ(2) <v ,θ(2)
u <v }, that is, when competition is
weak and uninformed bidders learn that their valuation is low. The loss however cannot be
larger than v (since Rs ≤ v under A).
Deﬁning Q =P r ( A∪C ∪D) and π =P r ( A | A∪C ∪D), we can thus bound the expected
diﬀerence in revenues as follows.
E[Rd − Rs] ≥ Q(π(−v)+( 1− π)(r0 − ∆)+( 1− Q)(−∆)
≥ Qr0 − πQ(v + r0) − ∆
where r0 =m i n ( rC,r D). To conclude on whether revenues increase in expectation, we just
need to evaluate the probability π. Our result follows from the observation that π vanishes
when n gets large. To see this, observe that since either n1 ≥ n/2 or n2 ≥ n/2,w eh a v e
π ≤ max(Pr[A | A ∪ C ∪ D,n2 ≥ n/2],Pr[A | A ∪ C ∪ D,n1 ≥ n/2])
π vanishes when n gets large because




u ≥ p∗ | n2}
,
which vanishes when n2 gets large, and because
Pr{A | A ∪ C ∪ D,n1} ≤
Pr{θ(2) <v| n1}
Pr{θ(2) < b p | n1}
which vanishes when n1 gets large. Q.E.D.
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